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Abstract 
 
Unethical behavior such as dishonesty, cheating and corruption occurs frequently in 
organizations or groups. Recent experimental evidence suggests that there is a stronger 
inclination to behave immorally in groups than individually. We ask if this is the case, and if so, 
why. Using a parsimonious laboratory setup, we study how individual behavior changes when 
deciding as a group member. We observe a strong dishonesty shift. This shift is mainly driven 
by communication within groups and turns out to be independent of whether group members 
face payoff commonality or not (i.e. whether other group members benefit from one’s lie). 
Group members come up with and exchange more arguments for being dishonest than for 
complying with the norm of honesty. Thereby, group membership shifts the perception of the 
validity of the honesty norm and of its distribution in the population. 
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“I did steal from Enron. We stole from Enron.” 
The Enron Trial: Testimony of Andrew Fastow (former CFO of Enron) 
“The conduct was fairly open and notorious, I would say.  
It was no great secret what we were doing.” 
Christopher Loehr (former analyst for Enron) 
1 Introduction 
Groups and organizations sometimes fail to comply with a moral norm. They lie, they cheat, they are 
dishonest, they are corrupt, and they commit fraud. However, it is not organizations that take those 
decisions; it is individuals that are part of the organization. Can we thus explain undesired behavior in 
organizations simply by aggregating individual failures to comply with the norm? Or, are there other 
elements inherent to the organization or to its structure that can help us better understand how 
undesired behavior emerges? And, how does undesired behavior of individuals differ from behavior 
within or by an entire organization? While these are relevant questions, surprisingly little empirical 
evidence exists (Conrads et al., 2013; Sutter, 2009). This paper addresses these questions in a 
parsimonious setup that allows us to identify some of the potential reasons for collective failure to 
follow a moral norm or to comply with desired behavior. 
Recent years have provided several prominent examples of unethical behaviors in groups and 
organizations. Fraudulent accounting methods and malpractice of groups of executive officers have 
led to the marked bankruptcies of WorldCom and Enron. More recently, it has been discovered that 
inter alia the German car producer Volkswagen has sold diesel cars with emissions certificates based 
on potentially faulty information.1 To improve emission test results Volkswagen has allegedly 
installed software in their diesel engines that could detect when the cars were on the test stand and 
adjust the engine performance accordingly. After investigations by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), newspaper articles say that “VW must have had a chain of management command 
that approved fitting cheating devices to its engines”.2 However, it is not only for-profit firms that are 
involved in unethical behavior: there are cases of charities that commit embezzlement, sports 
                                                     
1 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/11880433/How-has-Volkswagen-tricked-the-
US-over-car-emissions.html, last downloaded: Feb 3, 2016. 
2 See also http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772, last downloaded: Nov 29, 2015. 
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organizations and executives that generate financial scandals or engage in morally and legally 
questionable practices in the context of doping, and sports teams that violate established norms.3 
This study provides a twofold contribution. First, we implement a parsimonious laboratory 
setup to investigate whether groups (as our proxy for small organizations) are indeed more inclined to 
engage in dishonest or unethical behaviors than individuals, as casual observation and some previous 
results in the literature suggest (e.g., Chytilova and Korbel, 2014; Conrads et al., 2013; Gino et al., 
2013; Muehlheusser et al., 2015; Sutter, 2009; Weisel and Shalvi, 2015). We find that the answer is 
affirmative. Individuals lie less frequently when deciding alone as compared to groups. Second, we 
offer and disentangle explanations for this “dishonesty shift”. There are several candidate 
explanations: (i) a simple aggregation of individual inclinations as a consequence of aggregation rules 
(i.e. decision making procedures) within the group; (ii) the incentive structure inherent to many group 
decisions (oftentimes, all members share group payoffs equally and an individual deviation from 
either of the strategies – behaving dishonest or honest – can sometimes reduce payoffs for everyone 
dramatically); (iii) the decreased observability of one’s actions within a group, potentially making the 
individual less accountable for their actions when they are group members; and (iv) the deliberation 
process inherent to group interaction involving, for instance, the exchange of arguments and learning 
about the strength and prevalence of a norm. 
Our laboratory experiment uses a variant of the die-rolling task introduced by Fischbacher and 
Föllmi‐Heusi (2013). Participants are asked to report the result of a die roll and their payoffs depends 
on their reports.4 Hence participants face a trade-off between being honest by reporting the true 
number and potentially forgoing a monetary profit (i.e. following the norm of honesty), on the one 
hand, and being dishonest and potentially earning more (i.e. violating the norm of honesty), on the 
other hand. We implement individual decision making situations and group decision making 
situations using an experimental design that allows us to study behavioral change (within subjects) 
                                                     
3 See e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/business/4-cancer-charities-accused-in-ftc-fraud-case.html, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2015/09/fifa-corruption-scandal and 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/36542577, last downloaded: June 16, 2016. 
4 Our variant of the task is computerized and allows the experimenter to observe whether individuals misreport 
(for a similar idea see also Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2015). We explain the variant and the reasons for our design 
choice in more detail in Section 2. 
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across several (between subjects) treatments. Our setup enables us to disentangle the explanations 
mentioned above. 
In the die roll paradigm, a pure payoff maximizer would want to always report the number that 
yields the highest monetary payoff, regardless of the actual die roll. This is true for both the individual 
and the group decision making situation. If one assumes sufficiently high moral costs of lying, 
individuals might want to report truthfully, and the group outcome then depends on the aggregation of 
individual preferences. For instance, unanimity should lead to less lying than other aggregation 
mechanisms. Adding social image concerns, accountability considerations and changes in the 
perception of the norm, group interaction can drag the comparison between the indidivual and the 
group setting in any direction—towards more or less dishonest behavior (Bénabou, 2013; Bénabou 
and Tirole, 2006, 2012; Falk and Tirole, 2016). Ultimately, the question of whether groups or 
individuals are more or less dishonest (and the causes and consequences of any potential shift from 
the individual to the group setting) can only be answered empirically. 
A laboratory experiment has several advantages when it comes to the identification of the 
effects we are interested in: It allows us (i) to exogenously vary group membership and incentives for 
the group members to behave dishonestly; (ii) to observe individual behavior before individuals 
become members of a group as well as behavior/communication when the group decides; and (iii) to 
elicit individual beliefs about dishonest behavior of others. Naturally, there are limits to laboratory 
experiments. The task that we use is specific in the sense that it implies a zero fine for violating the 
norm of honesty. In bearing with the growing experimental literature on cheating and lying, this 
enables us to compare our results to exisiting studies that focus on individual decisions to lie. We 
implement group decisions in small groups with anonymous real-time chat interactions in order to 
keep as much experimental control as possible. These design choices lend themselves to extensions 
that bring the experimental setup closer to existing organizations with their hiearchies and with face-
to-face interactions. Ultimately, field experiments are a desired methodology. Our aim here is to 
establish a set of explanations in a rigorosly controlled environment that feeds into the design of 
future studies, relaxing some of our restrictions systematically. 
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The results from our setup reinforce the conclusion from the small existing literature: Groups 
are (much) more inclined to lie than individuals. Drawing on the older psychology literature that 
detected a shift from individuals to groups in terms of risky decisions making, coining it the “risky 
shift” (Pruitt and Teger, 1969; Teger and Pruitt, 1967), we refer to our finding as the “dishonesty 
shift”. However, our main contribution is providing an explanation for this shift: The shift can neither 
be explained by a higher level of strategic sophistication of groups than individuals (Sutter, 2009), nor 
by a decreased observability of one’s action as a group member. Both explanations are excluded by 
our design. Using appropriate treatment variations, we can also rule out that groups lie more than 
individuals because the other group members benefit from lying (Gino et al., 2013) or because group 
decisions require unanimity. 
Our findings provide strong evidence for the importance of two mechanisms that drive the 
dishonesty shift and that are inherent to almost any group interaction: communication and learning 
about norm compliance. Communication exposes group members frequently to arguments in favor of 
violating the norm. The exchange of arguments and talking to people that argue in favor of violating 
the norm also changes the norm perception. We show that the expectation that other people (out-of-
sample) lie increases significantly after the group interaction. A detailed analysis of the protocols 
from the group interaction suggests that groups lie more because communication enables them to 
justify dishonest behavior in a different way than individuals. Further we find that the dishonesty shift 
in groups is very strong such that the group composition (in terms of the number of initially dishonest 
group members) only weakly affects the extent of dishonesty in a group. 
Understanding the mechanisms that contribute to the dishonesty shift is essential as it is a 
prerequisite for designing institutions and incentives that are conducive to norm compliance. Our 
results show that the availability and exchange of arguments that justify norm violating behavior is an 
important aspect. Such exchange is occurring naturally in groups where group members discuss how 
they should act. A next step could be to analyze potential mechanisms in the group interaction that are 
able to counterbalance this effect such as reminders of the norm or other related interventions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the details of our 
experimental design and procedures, gives an overview of the literature, and provides behavioral 
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predictions. In Section 3, we present the results from our experiment. Section 4 discusses our findings, 
and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Experimental Design, Related Literature, and Predictions 
 
2.1 Experimental Design and Procedures 
We use a variant of the die-rolling task introduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), in which 
a pure payoff maximizer would want to always report the number that yields the highest monetary 
payoff (irrespective of the observed die roll). Experimental participants see a video of a die roll on 
their computer screen. The computer randomly chooses one out of six videos, each showing one 
possible outcome. Participants are informed about this, i.e. they know that the computer chooses each 
video with the same probability. The outcome of the die roll in the video is clearly visible for about 10 
seconds. The participants’ task is to enter the outcome shown in the video on the next screen, in a 
field stating “die number seen: ___ ”. Participants can enter any number between 1 and 6. 
Importantly, payoffs depend on the number entered, not on the number actually seen. We use the 
same payoff structure as the original experiment, i.e. die numbers 1 to 5 yield one to five points 
respectively and die number 6 yields zero points. As participants can enter any number between one 
and six, they have the possibility to report dishonestly. As we explicitly asked participants to report 
the number seen, we refer to deviating from truthful reporting as “dishonesty” or “lying” for the rest 
of the paper.  
Die rolls shown in the video are chosen randomly by the computer and known by the 
experimenter such that participants cannot disguise their lies.5 Thus, in contrast to the original die-
rolling task, misreporting the die number in our experiment is clearly dishonest, but liars cannot 
disguise (for a similar task with observability see also Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2015). This is a 
desirable feature for our purposes for at least two reasons. First, the paradigm ensures that groups do 
                                                     
5 Note that participants are informed about the experimental procedures. Hence, incomplete lying should occur 
rarely in our experiment. 
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not lie more than individuals because it is easier to disguise lies in a group, as individual decisions are 
clearly observable by the experimenter in individual and group treatments. Second, the paradigm 
allows us to study in a within-subject design how individual behavior changes (i.e. when reporting 
alone as compared to when reporting after communication in a group). Further, the task is easy to 
understand, and we can thus exclude that groups have a significantly better understanding of the task. 
Nonetheless, full observability may affect the level of lying (as compared to no observability). Our 
main analysis focuses therefore on the relative comparison between individual decision making and 
group decision making (and not on the absolute levels of dishonest behavior). Interestingly, direct 
comparisons between situations of full observability by the experimenter and full privacy (Kajackaite 
and Gneezy, 2015) show minor differences in the absolute extent of lying, and similar conclusions can 
be drawn from comparable experiments that introduce an anonymous observer of the private die roll 
other than the experimenter (see, e.g., Baeker and Mechtel, 2015; Houser et al., 2016; Van de Ven and 
Villeval, 2015). 
We implement a mixture of a within-subject and a between-subject design with three different 
between-subject treatments (Individual, GroupPC and GroupNoPC). Figure 1 illustrates the 
experimental design. Each treatment consists of three independent parts, for which instructions  
are displayed on-screen at the beginning of each part. One of the three parts is randomly  
determined to be payoff relevant at the end of the experiment, and this is common knowledge.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental design and elicitation of beliefs. Note: Subjects are randomly allocated 
either to treatment Individual, GroupPC or GroupNoPC (between-subject) and participate in all three 
parts (within-subject). 
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In the Individual treatment, participants make the same decision in each of the three parts: They see a 
video of a die roll on their screen and are asked to enter the die number seen on the next screen. In the 
two group treatments, the first part and the third part are equivalent to the decision in the same parts in 
Individual. In the second part of the group treatments, subjects decide in groups of three participants 
that are randomly assembled. Each participant in a group sees the same video (and this is common 
knowledge). After group members have seen the video, they have five minutes time to discuss in a 
group chat. The real-time chat allows for free-form communication without revealing one’s identity 
(excluding the possibility of threats and side-payments). All three group members see all messages 
that are sent in the chat. The three members can also decide unanimously to leave the chat before its 
automated ending. After the chat, each participant privately enters the number (as in Individual), 
making each individual decision fully observable by the experimenter in all treatments. The two group 
treatments reflect different organizational structures as we vary whether or not group members earn a 
common payoff. In GroupPC, participants face a decision with payoff commonality. Each member of 
a group has to enter the same number to receive a payoff, and each participant receives the payoff that 
corresponds to the number entered. If entered numbers differ within a group, all group members 
receive zero payoffs. Such a protocol implements a strong unanimity component. In GroupNoPC, 
participants face no payoff commonality, i.e. they receive payoffs according to the number they enter, 
irrespective of the number entered by the other group members. GroupNoPC is thus identical to 
Individual except for the group chat after having seen the same video. It is important to notice that 
there is no pressure to contribute to the chat and that the content of the chat is totally up to the 
participants (i.e. they could talk about the weather, the weekend, and anything they wanted, except for 
revealing their identities in any way). 
As the first part is identical in all treatments (and also decisions are very similar) we can use 
the between-subject comparisons between Individual and GroupPC as well as Individual and 
GroupNoPC in Part 2 to establish the difference in dishonest behavior between individual and groups 
(i.e. the potential existence of the dishonesty shift). The comparison between behavior GroupPC and 
GroupNoPC in Part 2 allows us to address the effect of payoff commonality, i.e. the relevance of the 
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other-regarding concerns argument in group decision making that involves a trade-off between payoff 
maximization and norm compliance.6 
To observe whether the group chat changes participants’ beliefs about others’ behavior in terms 
of (dis)honesty, we elicit our participants’ beliefs about the lying behavior in a past experiment (i.e. in 
the baseline condition of Fischbacher and Föllmi‐Heusi, 2013). Following Fischbacher and Föllmi‐
Heusi (2013), we elicit participants’ beliefs about the distribution of payoffs. We inform our 
participants that they have to guess the behavior of other participants in a similar, previously run 
experiment (from now on “reference experiment”). Participants then guess the shares of participants 
that earned a specific payoff, i.e. 0 points, 1 point, 2 points, etc. Implicitly, the distribution provides 
the belief about honesty of similar decision makers. Participants earn five euros if they guessed all 
shares correctly. For every percentage point deviation from the correct shares we reduce participants’ 
payoff by 0.04 euros. The minimum payoff they can earn in the belief elicitation task is 0.50 euros. To 
avoid potential problems of hedging, we randomly selected one of the two belief elicitation tasks at 
the end of the experiment to be payoff-relevant.7 Two aspects of the belief elicitation are important: 
First, the way we elicit beliefs makes it clear to participants that we ask them about past behavior of 
other participants, which is exogenous to the current experiment. Second, we make clear that the data 
from the reference experiment is exactly the same for Belief Elicitation 1 and Belief Elicitation 2. 
Hence, changes in elicited values indicate a change in beliefs that can only be explained by the 
experience in our experiment. 
During our experiment, each participant sat at a randomly assigned, separated PC terminal and 
received a copy of printed general instructions upfront.8 These informed participants that the 
experiment consists of three independent parts (one randomly determined to be payoff-relevant at the 
end) and that the specific instructions for each part would be displayed at the beginning of each part 
on the participants’ computer screen. A set of on-screen control questions ensured the understanding 
                                                     
6 As our focus is on how lying behavior changes in groups as compared to individuals (Part 1 and 2) we do not 
provide a detailed analysis of the data from Part 3. Lying rates in Part 3 are high (71.8 in Individual, 82.1 in 
GroupPC, and 84.6 in GroupNoPC) and do not differ significantly across treatment.  
7 This random draw was independent of the random draw that determined payoffs for the lying task.  
8 The translated version of the instructions can be found in the online appendix (section C). 
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of the game in each part.9 Each part started only after all subjects answered the control questions 
correctly. Participants could fail the control questions repeatedly and were allowed to ask the 
experimenter to provide an explanation. No form of communication was allowed during the 
experiment (except through the computerized chat environment in the group treatments). We 
conducted all sessions at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences 
(MELESSA) at LMU Munich. The MELESSA subject pool includes undergraduate and graduate 
students of all fields of study. The data for the main treatments was collected over 14 sessions 
between June and September 2015, with 273 participants in total (39 in Individual, 117 in GroupPC, 
and 117 in GroupNoPC).10 In the first two sessions, the computer randomly selected for each group in 
each part one out of the six possible videos of a die roll with equal probability. To increase statistical 
power and simplify non-parametric comparisons between treatments, we used these randomly 
determined sets of videos in the later sessions, such that in each part, the same die rolls were observed 
in each treatment. This procedure ensures that die rolls displayed are held constant across treatments, 
and we can compare the number of dishonest reports across treatments, holding the monetary costs of 
being honest constant. In our main analysis we compare the individual-level data of the control 
treatment to the collapsed data from the group treatments.11 Hence we have 39 statistically 
independent observations in each treatment. 
Participants received a show-up fee of four euros that was added to the earnings from the 
experiment. Subjects could earn points, where one point was equal to two euros. The experiment took 
about an hour. The average income (including the show-up fee) amounts to 14.62 euros. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We recruited 
                                                     
9 As Part 3 was identical to Part 1, we displayed the control questions in Part 3 again, but showed the subjects 
the correct answers. The correlation between the number of times participants failed to answer the control 
questions correctly and the extent of (dis)honesty is small and fails to be statistically significant (Spearman’s 
Rho, individual level data, Part 1: -0.0963, p = 0.112; Part 2: -0.027, p = 0.663). Hence, problems in 
understanding the experimental procedures are unlikely to explain variation in lying behavior between 
treatments in the experiment. 
10 Two sessions (n=39) of an additional control treatment (IndividualDeliberation) that allows us to look into 
one of the potential explanations were conducted in February 2016 (see also Section 4). 
11 We collapse the group treatment data on the behavior of the group median to ease applicability of non-
parametric tests. Using group averages (where applicable) yields very similar results. 
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participants using the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and excluded all subjects with 
previous experience in die rolling tasks or other similar experiments. 
 
2.2 Related Literature and Behavioral Predictions 
In our task, a rational selfish individual would want to report a “5”, regardless of the actual die roll. 
This is true for both the individual and the group decision making situation. The experimental 
literature in economics has shown that frequently individuals are willing to forego monetary benefits 
to behave honestly in such situations (see e.g. Abeler et al., 2014; Cappelen et al., 2013; Erat and 
Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher and Föllmi‐Heusi, 2013; Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer, 2015; Gneezy, 
2005; Gneezy et al., 2013; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2015; Kröll and Rustagi, 2016; Lundquist et al., 
2009; Mazar et al., 2008). This contrasts behavior of purely self-interested payoff maximizers but is in 
line with models that incorporate moral costs of lying.  
Recent work has started to investigate dishonesty in groups (e.g. Baeker and Mechtel, 2015; 
Chytilova and Korbel, 2014; Conrads et al., 2013; Muehlheusser et al., 2015; Sutter, 2009). The group 
decision making setup adds several dimensions to the problem. First, it adds the aggregation problem 
of individual preferences in case they are not completely aligned. Second, the group setup might make 
social aspects more relevant: hiding behind the other group members (accountability), payoff 
commonality and the need to coordinate, and social imagine concerns. Based on existing work, we 
may expect groups to lie more than individuals for at least three reasons: First, groups may generally 
apply significantly higher levels of reasoning than individuals (Kocher et al., 2006; Kocher and Sutter, 
2005). Thus, groups may lie more as they have a better understanding of the game (Sutter, 2009). 
Second, groups may lie more, as it can be easier to disguise lying in groups than individual lies 
(Conrads et al., 2013). Both arguments should play a minor role in the context of our experimental 
design. The task is easy, and individual choices are perfectly observable by the experimenter in all 
treatments. Third, recent work suggests that groups could lie more because others may benefit as well 
from dishonest behavior (Gino et al., 2013; Weisel and Shalvi, 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011). The 
comparison between treatments GroupPC and GroupNoPC will address this argument explicitly. 
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However, there are also good arguments against a stronger prevalence of lying among groups than 
among individuals or arguments that do not provide a signed prediction. First, social image concerns 
should be stronger when deciding in a group (see e.g. Bénabou, 2013; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; 
Bénabou and Tirole, 2012). Second, changes in the perception of the norm in the course of the group 
interaction can drag the comparison between the indidivual and the group setting towards more or less 
dishonest behavior. To be conservative, we formulate the following null hypotheses: 
ܪ଴ଵ: The shares of dishonest reports in Part 2 in Individual and GroupPC do not differ. 
ܪ଴ଶ: The shares of dishonest reports in Part 2 in GroupPC and GroupNoPC do not differ. 
 
3 Results 
We structure the results section as follows. First, in Section 3.1, we present results on whether groups 
lie more than individuals, and if so, whether dishonesty becomes more prevalent in groups due to 
payoff commonality and how group communication affects beliefs about norm compliance (out-of-
sample). Then we analyze the effect of group composition in terms of Part 1 liars on group decisions 
(in Section 3.2). In Section 3.3, we provide a content analysis of the group chat. Section 3.4 provides 
additional robustness tests for our main results, controlling for personal characteristics of group 
members. 
 
3.1 Dishonesty Shift and Payoff Commonality  
Figure 2 illustrates participants’ reporting behavior in Part 1, 2 and 3 by showing the numbers subjects 
reported (y-axis) conditional on the number they have seen (x-axis). Note that the figure organizes the 
axis based on points, which means that the “6” is shown at the origin. It is clear that we observe 
either honest reporting (dots along the 45° line) or dishonest reporting by stating the number that 
yields the highest returns, i.e. “5”.12 The fraction of subjects misreporting in Part 1 ranges from 31 to 
                                                     
12 The absence of incomplete lying is in line with the fact that there is nothing to disguise in our experiment (in 
contrast to Fischbacher and Föllmi‐Heusi, 2013). It also confirms the findings of a similar treatment in 
Kajackaite and Gneezy (2015) that uses an “observed game”. 
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41 percent and – as Part 1 is identical for all treatments – does not differ significantly between 
treatments (Fisher’s exact tests, GroupPC vs. Individual: p=0.810; GroupNoPC vs. Individual: 
p=0.479; and GroupPC vs. GroupNoPC: p=0.816). In Part 2, we observe significantly more lying in 
GroupPC than in Individual. The fraction of dishonest reports amounts to 89.7 percent in GroupPC 
whereas in Individual, 61.5 percent of participants misreport their number (Fisher’s exact test, 
p=0.007). The results are qualitatively similar and remain statistically significant if we exclude 
participants who saw a “5” in Part 1 (who had no monetary incentive to lie).13 We thus reject ܪ଴ଵ.  
 
Treatments        Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 
Individual 
GroupPC 
GroupNoPC 
  
Figure 2: Die numbers seen and die numbers reported across treatments and parts (jittered)  
Note: In Individual, each dot represents one participant’s reported number. In the group treatments, each dot 
represents the median number reported in a group. For readability the figure shows points (i.e. a die role of “6” 
is shown as 0 points). 
 
                                                     
13 As a robustness test, we conducted all analyses reported in this paper also for a subsample that excludes 
participants who have seen a “5” in Part 1. All results remain unchanged, i.e. they are qualitatively similar 
and differences remain significant, except for one result concerning the influence of the group composition on 
misreporting (which we discuss in Section 3.2). The online appendix (section B1) provides more details. 
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In GroupNoPC, the fraction of dishonest reports amounts to 86.3 percent which is also significantly 
larger than the 61.5 percent in Individual (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.007) but does not differ 
significantly from the median of misreports in GroupPC (Fisher’s exact test, p=1.00). Hence, we 
cannot reject	ܪ଴ଶ. We summarize our findings in Result 1. 
 
Result 1: Groups lie significantly more than individuals, irrespective of payoff commonalities. 
 
Both payoff commonality and mere communication in GroupNoPC strongly foster coordination. In 
GroupPC, all 39 groups coordinate, i.e. all members enter the same number (see Table 1). In 
GroupNoPC, group members do not have to enter the same number to receive a positive payoff and, 
as compared to GroupPC, slightly less members do so (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.025). Still, 33 out of 
39 groups coordinate after the group chat. In five out of the six remaining groups, two out of three 
members report dishonestly. To compare coordination in the group treatments with a benchmark, we 
simulate “coordination” behavior in Individual based on participants’ actual reporting from Part 2 in 
Individual.14  
 
Table 1: Coordination among group members in Part 2 
 
Coordination 
Number of 
dishonest 
reports 
Simulated 
groups 
Group 
PC 
Group 
NoPC 
Lying decision 
of individuals 
in Part 2 
Yes (all honest) 0 2 4 3 
No 1 11 0 1 
No 2 17 0 5 
No (all dishonest)  3 3 0 0 
Yes  (all dishonest) 3 6 35 30 
  S 39 39 39 
Coordination 
rate 
  20.5% 100% 84.6% 
Note: Simulated groups are based on Part 2 decisions in Individual. Note that for three simulated groups all 
group members lie, but they still do not coordinate (due to partial lying by one member). 
                                                     
14 Following the literature on peer effects (Falk and Ichino, 2006), we randomly place three different individuals 
who have seen the same number (i.e. have similar costs of lying) into a group and repeat this procedure until 
we have generated the same number of groups that have seen the particular number in each of the two group 
treatments. For this set of groups, we check how many groups coordinate. In total, we simulate 500 sets of 
groups in this way and take the average over how many groups coordinate in each simulated set. 
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As can be seen in Table 1, actual coordination rates in both GroupPC and GroupNoPC are 
significantly higher than coordination in simulated groups in Individual (Fisher’s exact tests, p<0.001 
for the two comparisons). We summarize our findings in Result 2. 
 
Result 2: Communication increases coordination. 
 
Next, we focus on how the group interaction affects participants’ beliefs about reporting 
behavior of subjects in a reference experiment. We elicited these beliefs once before Part 2 and once 
after Part 3. Figure 3 shows how participants’ beliefs about reporting behavior of subjects in the 
reference experiment changed from Part 1 to Part 3 for the three treatments. In Individual, the 
expected share of subjects reporting a “5” in the reference experiment increases from Part 1 to Part 3 
by 12.8 percentage points in Individual whereas the expected fractions of subjects reporting “6” and 
“2” decrease. In contrast, when participants interacted in a group, their beliefs change to a much 
larger extent. The expected share of subjects reporting a “5” in the reference experiment increases by 
35.7 (31.3) percentage points in GroupPC (GroupNoPC). We thus observe a significant change in the 
skewness of beliefs on the reported numbers in the reference experiments for group treatments 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, GroupPC: p=0.002; GroupNoPC: p<0.001) but not for Individual 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, p=0.735).15 Consequently, the difference in the belief changes is 
larger in the group treatments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, GroupPC vs. Individual: p=0.090, 
GroupNoPC vs Individual: p=0.006). We conclude with Result 3. 
 
Result 3: Group communication decreases beliefs about honest behavior of other 
participants in a reference experiment. 
 
                                                     
15 We calculate the non-parametric skewness Sit=(m-u)/s measure for each individual’s belief distribution and 
compare this measure for Part 1 and Part 3, where m represents the mean, u the median, and s the standard 
deviation. The tests for the group treatments uses group-level data (collapsed on the median). 
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Figure 3: Change in beliefs about reported payoffs in a reference experiment in terms of the 
share of participants that reported a payoff p e {0;1;2;3;4;5} 
 
3.2 The Role of (Dis)honest Individuals in Groups  
We document a strong dishonesty shift in both group treatments casting doubt on the idea that 
behavior in groups is a simple result of individual preference aggregation due to payoff 
commonalities. Our experimental design allows us to shed more light on how dishonesty evolves in 
groups. By studying how the group composition (in terms of participants’ individual tendency to 
report dishonestly in Part 1) affects the propensity to lie in Part 2. Figure 4 displays the share of group 
members reporting dishonestly in Part 2 conditional on the number of group members who 
misreported in Part 1. Surprisingly, the group composition does (if at all) play a weak role for 
dishonest reporting in Part 2 of the group treatments (Spearman’s Rho: 0.135, p=0.237; Fisher’s exact 
test p=0.489). Even in groups consisting of three previously honest individuals, the vast majority 
decides to report dishonestly after the group interaction. Only when excluding those participants who 
have seen a 5 in Part 1, i.e. those for whom we do not know whether they would have reported 
dishonestly if they had seen a different number, we find weak evidence for differences in lying levels 
across different group compositions (Spearman’s Rho=0.253, p=0.041, Fisher’s exact test p=0.213).16 
We summarize this finding in Result 4. 
 
Result 4: Group composition in terms of lying in Part 1 affects lying in groups in Part 2 
only weakly. It does not matter for GroupPC, and it matters weakly for GroupNoPC. 
                                                     
16 For a more detailed analysis, see the online appendix (section B1). 
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Figure 4: Dishonest reporting across treatments conditional on the number of group members 
who misreported in Part 1. 
 
3.3 The Impact of Arguments Used in the Group Chat 
Results 1 to 3 show that communication has a detrimental effect on honest reporting behavior as well 
as on beliefs about others’ honesty. To understand how the group chat affected reporting behavior, 
four research assistants (to whom the purpose of the study was unknown) independently coded each 
of the chats using a codebook with a predefined set of variables of interest.17 Naturally, some coders 
interpreted the chat protocols differently than others. To obtain reliable values for our variables of 
interest which, on the one hand, reflect the majority opinion of coders and are, on the other hand, not 
systematically biased to extreme values we used the median value for each variable of interest if 
coders disagreed.18 We observe on average 17.45 (std dev. = 8.76) messages in our 78 groups, and 
chats last about 162 seconds (std dev. = 85.7).19 First, we examine which arguments are used and 
whether their use is intended to encourage honest or dishonest behavior. Then, we analyze the impact 
of these arguments on participants’ actions. 
                                                     
17 The codebook including the complete list of variables can be found in the online appendix (section D).  
18 Note that in 83 percent of cases at least three coders agreed on a value of a variable. Our results are robust to 
using average ratings instead of medians.  
19 Chats in GroupNoPC are longer than in GroupPC, both in terms of messages and duration (Wilcoxon 
ranksum exact tests, p=0.003 and p<0.001, respectively). Otherwise we find only minor differences in the 
structure and the content of the chats (as discussed below).  
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Table 2: Number of groups using honest and dishonest arguments 
 Arguments for 
Dishonesty mentioned 
 
Arguments for 
Honesty mentioned Yes No ∑ 
Yes 13 6 19 
No 27 32 59 
∑ 40 38 78 
 
In 51 percent of our groups (40 out of 78) arguments for dishonesty are explicitly mentioned, 
whereas only 19 groups make arguments for honesty (see Table 2). Thus, dishonest arguments are 
made more frequently than honest arguments (c2-test, p=0.086). The average share of messages 
containing arguments for dishonest behavior (i.e. the number of messages using arguments for 
dishonest reporting in a group divided by the number of messages including arguments for honest and 
dishonest reporting in the group) amounts to 43.4 percent and is significantly higher than the share of 
honest messages (16 percent; within group comparison, Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, p<0.001). 
First, suggestions on which number to report are made by both honest and dishonest individuals 
(classified according to their behavior in Part 1) in equal proportion. Comparing whether groups make 
no argument for (dis)honesty or at least one argument we do not observe any significant differences 
between GroupPC and GroupNoPC concerning dishonest arguments (c2-test, p=0.365). More groups 
without payoff commonality send, however, at least one argument for honesty (p=0.065). We 
summarize our findings in Result 5. 
 
Result 5: Arguments for dishonesty occur significantly more frequently than arguments 
for honesty, irrespective of payoff commonality. 
 
Let us now turn to what arguments are made in favor of honest and dishonest reporting and 
how these arguments relate to actual reporting behavior. Figure 5 illustrates the share of groups in 
which specific arguments were made to encourage dishonest (Panel A) and honest reporting (Panel B) 
for GroupPC and GroupNoPC separately. We refer to Money if the argument made related to the 
monetary consequences of reporting (e.g. “we will earn more if we choose to report a higher number 
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than the number shown”). Honesty arguments directly refer to honesty as a norm or value (e.g “there 
is no need to be honest” or “it is important to be honest”). Insecurity refers to insecurity concerning 
the task (e.g. “I am uncertain about the task” or “I thought we should enter the number we want to 
enter”). Rules refer to explicit arguments that include (non-)compliance with the rules (e.g. “we 
should stick to the rules” or “there is no need to stick to the rules”). Others’ behavior refers to honesty 
of others outside the group (e.g., people’s behavior in general or other participants’ behavior).  
The majority of arguments refer to Money, Honesty and Insecurity (see Figure 5). In both 
GroupPC and GroupNoPC, participants use Money mainly to encourage dishonest reporting, and they 
do so to a similar extent (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.233). Explicitly referring to Honesty is the main 
argument used in favor of honesty, being raised significantly more often in GroupNoPC (Fisher’s 
exact test, p=0.008). Insecurity is used to encourage both dishonest and honest behavior. As the use of 
arguments relating to Insecurity does not correlate with wrongly answered control questions in Part 2 
(Spearman, referring to honesty: rho=-0.05, p=0.65; referring to dishonesty: rho=-0.06, p=0.59), 
participants may use these type of arguments in particular as a justification for their preferred 
behavior, i.e. as an excuse for dishonest behavior or as support for honest reporting.  
 
 
Figure 5: Arguments to encourage (dis)honest reporting
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Table 3: Lying behavior and arguments used 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Probit (ME) 
 Misreporting in Part 2 
Money (Dishonest Use) 0.0629 0.0631 0.0572 
 (0.0549) (0.0560) (0.0532) 
Money (Honest Use) -0.291** -0.291** -0.320** 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.134) 
Honesty (Dishonest Use) 0.0437 0.0429 0.0475 
 (0.0984) (0.0949) (0.0845) 
Honesty (Honest Use) -0.0773** -0.0777* -0.0526 
 (0.0382) (0.0401) (0.0353) 
Insecurity (Dishonest Use) 0.0187 0.0179 0.00132 
 (0.0763) (0.0750) (0.0532) 
Insecurity (Honest Use) -0.375*** -0.376*** -0.343*** 
 (0.125) (0.131) (0.126) 
Rules (Dishonest Use)    
    
Rules (Honest Use) -0.266** -0.268* -0.215 
 (0.132) (0.138) (0.133) 
Others’ Behavior  -0.162 -0.163 -0.127 
(Dishonest Use) (0.151) (0.151) (0.149) 
Others’ Behavior     
(Honest Use)    
GroupPC  -0.00245 0.00225 
  (0.0579) (0.0545) 
Misreporting in Part 1   0.0869** 
   (0.0364) 
Observations 234 234 234 
Cluster 78 78 78 
Pseudo-/R-squared 0.423 0.423 0.450 
Robust standard errors clustered on group level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Note: Arguments relating to others’ being honest and arguments referring to Rules to encourage dishonest 
reporting have been dropped due to multicollinearity. 
 
Models (1) – (3) in Table 3 regress the probability of a dishonest report on arguments used for 
encouraging both honest and dishonest behavior. Model (1) shows that, given the high lying rates we 
observe, arguments that encourage honest reporting explain variation in lying best. We find that 
arguments in favor of honest reporting that refer to Money, Honesty, Insecurity, and Rules reduce the 
probability of dishonest reporting significantly. In Model (2), we introduce the treatment dummy 
GroupPC, which does not significantly influence dishonest reporting (compared to GroupNoPC). In 
Model (3) we additionally include whether or not an individual has misreported in Part 1. 
Misreporting in Part 1 significantly increases the probability of reporting dishonestly in Part 2. 
Introducing this additional control does not strongly affect the magnitude of the other coefficients 
20 
 
much. However, the coefficient for Honesty (Honest Use) and Rules (Honest Use) becomes 
statistically insignificant in Model (3).20 We summarize these findings in Result 6. 
 
Result 6: Arguments encouraging honesty significantly reduce lying behavior. 
 
3.4 Individual Characteristics and Lying 
In addition to our treatment effects, individual characteristics may play an important role for the 
decision to report dishonestly. As a robustness test we report results from a series of probit regressions 
on dishonest reporting including additional controls for individual characteristics (e.g. Machiavelli 
Scores, Big 5, Risk attitudes, Religiousness, Political attitudes, Gender, Age) in Tables A1-A3 of the 
online appendix (Section A). Our treatment effects remain robust and we find no significant effect of 
any control variable except for gender.21 The gender effect that we observe is in line with  
most previous studies: females tend to be less likely to lie as individuals (see e.g. the survey by 
Rosenbaum et al., 2014). Regression model (1) in Table 4 shows that females tend to misreport less in 
Part 2. The gender effect persists when controlling for our treatments in Model (2).  
 
Table 4: Lying and gender 
 Probit (ME) - Misreporting in Part 2 
 All All  Females Males 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GroupPC  0.205*** 0.266*** 0.116 
  (0.0585) (0.0781) (0.0744) 
GroupNoPC  0.169*** 0.231*** 0.0763 
  (0.0576) (0.0770) (0.0745) 
Female -0.0878** -0.0824**   
 (0.0381) (0.0366)   
Observations 273 273 167 106 
Clustered SE 117 117 100 76 
Pseudo-R2 0.017 0.079 0.0829 0.031 
Robust standard errors clustered on group level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                     
20 Adding the number seen in Part 2 as an explanatory variable (proxy for the monetary gain from a lie) in Models 
(1) to (3) leaves the results qualitatively unchanged. 
21 Note that other controls do not systematically affect lying behavior in Part 1. 
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However, the treatment effect on females is larger than on males (see Model (3) and (4), showing 
separate regressions for females and males). The coefficient for males is still positive but not 
statistically significant at conventional levels (p=0.140 for GroupPC and p=0.314 for GroupNoPC).  
4 Discussion and Alternative Explanations 
Our results document that communication in groups can have a detrimental effect on honest reporting 
behavior. One rationale for this result is that communicating in a group provides possibilities for 
individuals to deliberate and formulate justifications for dishonest behavior (see also Gino and Ariely, 
2012; Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2012). Another rationale is that exchanging justifications 
enables group members to coordinate and establish the validity of a norm regarding honesty and to 
what extent it is shared among others. In order to address these two aspects, we conduct an additional 
control treatment which allows for deliberation but not for communication; IndividualDeliberation 
(n=39). Part 1 and 3 of IndividualDeliberation are identical to the Individual treatment described in 
Section 2. In Part 2, IndividualDeliberation offers participants the possibility to deliberate before 
entering the number seen in Part 2: After observing the die roll, participants have five minutes to write 
down their thoughts and only afterwards enter their number. As in the group treatments (where 
participants could leave the chat) participants in IndividualDeliberation were allowed to leave the 
entry screen before its automated ending. Thus IndividualDeliberation allows participants to 
deliberate and formulate justifications for dishonest behavior but excludes establishing the validity 
arguments and sharing of the norm among group members.  
Figure 6 illustrates the fraction of liars in Part 2 which is significantly smaller in both individual 
treatments as compared to the group treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.026 for both 
IndividualDeliberation vs. GroupPC and IndividualDeliberation vs. GroupNoPC; p=0.007 for both 
Individual vs. GroupPC and Individual vs. GroupNoPC; p=0.814 for Individual vs. 
IndividualDeliberation). That is, lying with deliberation is not significantly different from lying in  
 
 
 
22 
 
  
Figure 6: Lying in Part 2, by treatment. 
 
Individual but does significantly differ from lying behavior in groups.22 Also (and again in contrast to 
group communication) deliberation does not significantly change the skewness of beliefs about other 
participants’ honesty in the reference experiment (Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, p=0.164). One 
may expect individuals in IndividualDeliberation deliberate less than individuals in the group 
treatments. However, the number of individuals in IndividualDeliberation coming up with at least one 
dishonest argument is not statistically different from the number of groups who do so in GroupPC 
(c2-test, p=0.352), and it is even larger than the number of groups in GroupPC (c2-test, p=0.068).23 
Hence, we are confident that deliberation alone does not explain the increase of lying behavior in 
groups. In combination with Result 1 we conclude that it is the exchange of arguments and moral 
views within the group that shift group members’ expectations and behavior.24 
Finally, let us briefly discuss other potential explanations for the observed dishonesty shift. 
First, one may suspect that experimenter demand effects could play a role in our setting. For instance, 
groups might be more susceptible to experimenter demand effects than individuals and thereby lie 
more (or less). Identifying such demand effects is usually difficult, and there is no existing evidence 
                                                     
22 Note that levels of lying in Part 1 and Part 3 in IndividualDeliberation (48.7 and 76.9 percent) do not 
significantly differ from levels of lying in Individual (30.8 and 71.8 percent, Fisher’s exact test, Part 1: p=0.165 
and Part 3: p=0.796). 
23 This also holds true for the absolute number of dishonest arguments. Online appendix (section B3) provides 
further results from the content analysis of IndividualDeliberation. 
24 This conclusion is further supported by decision times which we analyze in the online appendix (section B2). 
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for a difference in susceptibility between individuals and groups. As we are able to observe 
communication of our participants we analyzed group chats with regard to any signs of experimenter 
demand effects. We find that only 4 out of 78 groups (5 percent) mention that the “honesty – money 
trade-off” might be part of the research question, and one group considered that the experimenter may 
be interested in the effect of the group chat on the decision. Also in IndividualDeliberation, only 5 
percent (two participants) refer to the research question. Hence, we find little (direct) evidence for an 
experimenter demand effect that interacts with our group treatments. Such a demand effect is thus 
unlikely to explain the observed dishonesty shift.  
Second, we observe increasing lying rates in the Individual treatment over the three parts. One 
may suspect that subjects learn over time that consequences of dishonest behavior are absent. If so, 
there is the possibility that communication in groups facilitates this “learning” and thereby increases 
lying rates faster. However, three empirical facts cast doubt on this interpretation. First, 74 percent of 
our groups do not address the potential consequences (positive or negative) of dishonest behavior, and 
the discussion of potential consequences does not significantly correlate with the decision to lie 
(Spearman’s Rho: positive consequences -0.069, p=0.550; negative consequences -0.129, p=0.260). 
Second, we do not find a statistically significant correlation between wrongly answered control 
question and lying behavior. Third, faster learning in the group treatments in Part 2 is unable to 
explain the significant increase in beliefs about others’ dishonesty in a reference experiment that we 
observe only for participants who communicated in a group. While participants in Individual have 
also learned about the consequences of lying, they do not change their beliefs about others’ lying 
behavior much. Thus, we are confident that group communication indeed changes how people 
rationalize morally questionable behavior, i.e. it is learning about the norm, not about the 
consequences of lying. 
Third, “hiding behind the group” as an individual (accountability argument) is a potential 
explanation for the dishonesty shift. However, this argument is hard to sustain in an environment with 
perfect observability by the experimenter, which we implemented on purpose to address this aspect. 
Further, if hiding behind the group was a main driver, lying in the Group treatments should decrease 
significantly in Part 3 (which we do not observe). 
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5 Conclusion 
Our results substantially improve the understanding of (dis)honest behavior in groups. First, 
complementing recent evidence on the role of collaboration opportunities for dishonesty when 
communication is absent (see Weisel and Shalvi, 2015), we observe that groups lie significantly more 
than individuals when group members face payoff commonality and have to coordinate on an action. 
Second, we show that the payoff commonality is not a necessary condition for groups to behave more 
dishonestly than individuals. If individuals communicate within a group but do not have to coordinate 
to receive a payoff, their behavior is very similar to the behavior of groups facing payoff 
commonality. Hence, we provide evidence that communication itself can have a detrimental effect on 
ethical behavior of small groups. We term this increased inclination to lie dishonesty shift. Evidence 
from our additional control treatment (IndividualDeliberation) shows that the dishonesty shift is not 
due to the fact that communicating in a group provides possibilities for individuals to deliberate or 
simply justify their actions to themselves. Instead, it is the exchange of justifications that enables 
group members to coordinate on dishonest actions and change their beliefs about moral behavior. The 
content analysis of our chat protocols backs up this interpretation, as it documents that group 
members indeed use the chat primarily to formulate and exchange arguments in favor of dishonest 
behavior. Additionally, we find that communication shifts group members’ beliefs about the 
prevailing honesty norm in a reference experiment, suggesting that group members indeed established 
a new norm regarding (dis-)honesty. 
Our findings also provide important insights for the design of institutions. We document a new 
argument for the prevalence of dishonesty in groups: Groups tend to lie more because they are able to 
communicate and thereby to rationalize morally wrong behavior in a different way than individuals. 
In turn, organizations fostering interaction and communication within groups are likely to provide 
room for group members not only to coordinate their actions, but also to adjust their beliefs and thus 
the norms they follow. Consequently, members of a group or unit within an organization may hold 
different beliefs about ethically acceptable behavior than individuals outside the group. While 
communication is obviously important and necessary to provide efficient coordination which can be 
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beneficial in many organizational contexts it may also have detrimental effects on the evolution of 
norm perception within groups. Therefore, organizational structures that foster communication might 
require to be paired with strong codes of conduct or exogenous monitoring (and punishment) to avoid 
honesty norms to erode. While reminders appealing to morality or religious beliefs have been shown 
to be effective in the short run (Mazar et al., 2008), long run impacts of such interventions are less 
well understood. More research is also needed to investigate how scrutiny (see e.g. Baeker and 
Mechtel, 2015; Houser et al., 2016; Van de Ven and Villeval, 2015) and efficient reporting 
mechanisms can be designed (Friesen and Gangadharan, 2013). Our results hint at the fact that such 
designs need to take into account how dishonest behavior evolves in groups and raises many 
interesting questions for future research, e.g. on the role of hierarchies in organizations, heterogeneity 
in the benefits from lying, monitoring and punishment, and self-selection of honest and dishonest 
individuals in leading roles.  
Over and above the analysis of potential organizational design features that are able to 
countervail the dishonesty shift, our results highlight a more general fact: communication in groups 
and organizations changes group members’ beliefs about moral behavior of others and increases 
coordination of group members’ behavior. While we observe a strong shift towards violating the 
honesty norm in groups, it remains an open question whether group members may coordinate on 
moral actions, depending on the original strength of the norm. 
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Online Appendix 
A – Additional robustness tests  
Table A1: Lying and social preferences 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Probit (ME) 
 Misreporting in Part 2 
          
GroupPC 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.205*** 0.206*** 
 (0.0591) (0.0595) (0.0592) (0.0595) (0.0584) (0.0606) (0.0595) (0.0590) (0.0577) 
GroupNoPC 0.170*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.167*** 0.163*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0593) (0.0575) (0.0586) (0.0583) (0.0561) 
Machiavelli (self) 0.00350        0.00156 
 (0.00327)        (0.00324) 
Machiavelli (other)  0.00163       0.00157 
  (0.00316)       (0.00256) 
Conscientiousness   -0.00713      0.00282 
   (0.0113)      (0.0121) 
Neuroticism    0.00214     0.000840 
    (0.0121)     (0.0123) 
Openness     -0.0206*    -0.0199* 
     (0.0109)    (0.0113) 
Extraversion      -0.000513   0.00132 
      (0.0105)   (0.0120) 
Agreeableness       0.00391  0.0171 
       (0.0119)  (0.0146) 
Social Desirability        0.0202 0.0188 
        (0.0147) (0.0166) 
          
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 
# cluster 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
Pseudo-R 0.070 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.078 0.063 0.064 0.076 0.095 
 
Robust standard errors clustered on group level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2: Lying and risk preferences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit (ME) 
Misreporting in Part 2 
       
GroupPC 0.208*** 0.213*** 0.210*** 0.208*** 0.205*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0598) (0.0600) (0.0590) (0.0596) (0.0616) (0.0610) 
GroupNoPC 0.173*** 0.180*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.177*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.0585) (0.0578) (0.0564) 
Risk (General) -0.00483     -0.00925 
 (0.0133)     (0.0203) 
Risk (Car)  0.0126    0.0141 
  (0.0145)    (0.0159) 
Risk (Money)   0.00610   0.00920 
   (0.0144)   (0.0177) 
Risk (Sport)    -0.000757  0.00005 
    (0.0114)  (0.0125) 
Risk (Career)     -0.00743 -0.00931 
     (0.0160) (0.0236) 
       
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 
# of Cluster 117 117 117 117 117 117 
Pseudo – R 0.064 0.067 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.071 
 
Robust standard errors clustered on group level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: Lying and socio-economic background 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Probit (ME) 
Misreporting in Part 2 
        
GroupPC 0.205*** 0.208*** 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.209*** 0.204*** 0.201*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0594) (0.0590) (0.0590) (0.0595) (0.0594) (0.0574) 
GroupNoPC 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.172*** 0.166*** 0.173*** 0.169*** 0.154** 
 (0.0576) (0.0584) (0.0581) (0.0585) (0.0588) (0.0583) (0.0565) 
Female -0.0824**      -0.0717**
 (0.0366)      (0.0363) 
Importance of religious questions  -0.00933     -0.00662 
(1=not important at all, 7=very important)  (0.00890)     (0.0085) 
Political Attitude   0.0239    0.0222 
(1=strongly left, 7=strongly right)   (0.0194)    (0.0199) 
Age    0.00523   0.00461 
    (0.00452)   (0.00414) 
Number of other participants known      -0.0285  -0.0167 
     (0.0650)  (0.0588) 
Number experiments participated in      0.00539* 0.00447 
      (0.00290) (0.00284) 
        
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 
# of Clusters 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
Pseudo-R 0.079 0.066 0.070 0.069 0.065 0.078 0.104 
 
Robust standard errors clustered on group level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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B: Additional Analyses (Group composition, decision times and 
IndividualDeliberation) 
B1: Group Composition 
In our main analysis we have shown that for the full sample (78 groups), the number of dishonest 
individuals in a group plays only a weak role for lying behavior in Part 2. Here we provide an 
additional analysis by excluding those participants who have seen a 5 in Part 1 and thus had no 
incentive to lie in Part 1. Focusing on this subsample (66 groups) we find some evidence for 
differences in misreporting across group composition. In GroupPC, the correlation between the 
number of honest individuals in a group and honest reporting is small and fails to be statistically 
significant (Rho: 0.148, p = 0.41) and Fisher’s exact test fails to reject the independence of lying 
behavior from group composition at the 10-percent level (p = 1). In GroupNoPC, for the subsample 
(33 groups) the share of dishonest individuals in Part 2 correlates significantly and positively with the 
number of group members who have reported dishonestly in Part 1 (Rho: 0.362, p = 0.0382), but 
Fisher’s exact test again fails to reject independence of group composition and lying behavior in 
Part 2 (p = 0.147).  
 
	
 
Figure B1: Dishonest reporting by group composition and treatment (subsample, 66 groups in total) 
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B2: Decision Times 
A recent debate surrounds the question of whether honesty or dishonesty is the “natural state” or 
requires deliberation (Foerster et al., 2013; Shalvi et al., 2012, 2013; Van't Veer et al., 2014). In the 
context of group decision making, uncertainty about the norm may result in longer decision times, 
whereas certainty about a prevailing (dis)honesty norm may result in shorter decision times. We find 
that in Part 1, misreporting individuals (on average 37 percent) take significantly longer in their 
decision to lie as compared to the individuals reporting the die roll that was actually displayed (mean 
honest reporting time: 12.64 sec (SD: 4.71); mean dishonest reporting time: 16.89 sec (SD: 9.20), 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, p = 0.012, Spearman’s Rho: 0.296, p = 0.001). Having 
communicated in a group makes decisions in the lying task significantly faster in Part 3 (mean 
reporting time: Individual: 13.49 sec (SD: 6.24); mean reporting time for GroupPC and GroupNoPC 
pooled: 10.40 sec (SD: 3.46), Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, p = 0.001).27 Further, in Part 3, 
decision times and dishonest behavior do not significantly relate to each other (mean honest reporting 
time: 11.08 sec (SD: 3.79); mean dishonest reporting time: 11.52 sec (SD: 5.02), Kolmogorov-
Smirnov exact test, p = 0.857, Spearman’s Rho: 0.019, p = 0.838). Notably, conditional on dishonest 
reporting in Part 3, participants who participated in the group chat report significantly faster non-
truthfully than participants from the Individual treatment (Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact 0.004; 
Spearman’s Rho: -0.27, p = 0.008; mean reporting time with communication: 10.48, SD: 3.71; 
without communication: 13.94, SD: 6.67). Having participated in the chat also speeds up decisions in 
the belief elicitation task (Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, p = 0.003). This might be seen as 
additional evidence that the chat has shifted beliefs about the honesty norm. 
 
  
                                                     
27 As GroupPC and GroupNoPC do not differ significantly in terms of decision times in Part 3 (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov exact test, lying decision: p = 0.467; belief elicitation time: p = 0.862) and to avoid multiple testing, we 
pool both group treatments and test them jointly against Individual.  
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B3: Content analysis of IndividualDeliberation 
As for the chats of the group treatments, coders analyzed the content of the stream of thoughts of 
IndividualDeliberation according to the pre-defined codebook in Appendix D. Our results show that 
many participants did indeed deliberate in this treatment. Participants took on average 234 seconds 
(std. dev. = 114.3) to write down their thoughts and 67 percent of participants (26 out of 39) in 
IndividualDeliberation explicitly mention arguments for dishonesty, whereas only 9 participants write 
down arguments for honesty (see Table B1). Only one participant decided not to write anything. 
Interestingly, frequencies of dishonest and honest arguments are not statistically different than in the 
group treatments (c2-test, GroupPC and GroupNoPC pooled, dishonest arguments: p = 0.114; honest 
arguments: p=0.878). The average share of statements containing arguments for dishonest behavior 
amounts to 59.2 percent and - as in the group treatments - is significantly higher than the share of 
honest messages (15.1 percent, Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, p<0.001).  
Table B1: Number of individuals using honest and dishonest arguments 
 Arguments for 
Dishonesty mentioned 
 
Arguments for 
Honesty mentioned Yes No ∑ 
Yes 6 3 9 
No 20 10 30 
∑ 26 13 39 
 
To analyze the influence of arguments made on misreporting behavior, we replicate Table 3 from the 
main text including the data from IndividualDeliberation in Table B2. The results are qualitatively 
similar and most importantly, when including a dummy for the group treatments in Model (2), we find 
that groups lie significantly more, even when controlling for the arguments made during the chat. This 
result is robust to controlling for misreporting in Part 1 (Model (3)). The analysis of 
IndividualDeliberation and its comparison with our two group treatments suggests that individuals 
come up with dishonest and honest argument to a similar extent as groups. Yet only the exchange and 
validation of these arguments within a group can lead to a shift in beliefs about the norm and 
corresponding changes in behavior.  
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Table B2: Lying behavior and arguments used 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Probit (ME) 
Misreporting in 2 
    
Money (Dishonest Use) 0.0485 0.0630 0.0537 
 (0.0480) (0.0474) (0.0455) 
Money (Honest Use) -0.406*** -0.416*** -0.448*** 
 (0.154) (0.160) (0.158) 
Honesty (Dishonest Use) -0.00915 -0.00619 -0.0263 
 (0.111) (0.0879) (0.0827) 
Honesty (Honest Use) -0.0709 -0.0785* -0.0438 
 (0.0475) (0.0450) (0.0403) 
Insecurity (Dishonest Use) 0.0288 0.0111 -0.00664 
 (0.0663) (0.0666) (0.0533) 
Insecurity (Honest Use) -0.354** -0.277* -0.209 
 (0.144) (0.160) (0.155) 
Rules (Dishonest Use)    
    
Rules (Honest Use) -0.308* -0.316** -0.249* 
 (0.173) (0.155) (0.144) 
Others' Behavior (Dishonest Use) -0.0468 0.0839 0.0926 
 (0.109) (0.104) (0.104) 
Others' Behavior (Honest Use)    
    
Group Treatments (Dummy)  0.330*** 0.351*** 
  (0.103) (0.107) 
Misreporting in Part 1   0.120*** 
   (0.0370) 
    
Observations 273 273 273 
Clusters 117 117 117 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.280 0.358 0.396 
Robust standard errors clustered on group level in parenthesis, *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Note: Arguments relating to others’ being honest and arguments referring to Rules to encourage dishonest 
reporting have been dropped due to multicollinearity. 
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C – Translated Instructions 
Appendix C includes the translated instructions (from German). Participants received the general 
instructions for the experiment in print. All further instructions were displayed on the computer screen 
at the beginning of the respective parts (see screenshots). We added comments in squared brackets [].  
 
General Instructions [printed] 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation! 
Please do not speak from now on with any other participant 
 
General procedures 
In this experiment we study economic decision making. You can earn money by participating. The 
money you earn will be paid to you after the experiment privately and in cash. 
The experiment consists of three parts in which you will take independent decisions. At the beginning 
of each part you will receive detailed instructions. If you have any questions about the instructions or 
during the experiment, please raise your hand. An instructor will then come to you and answer your 
questions privately.  
During the experiment, you and the other participants will make decisions and possibly you may 
interact with other participants. That is, both your own decisions and the decisions of the other 
participants may determine your payoff. How your payoff is exactly determined will be explained in 
the on-screen instructions. 
Payment 
In some parts of the experiment, we are not talking about Euro but about points. Your income for 
these parts is calculated in points. We will convert the points into euros at the end of the experiment, 
with an exchange rate of: 
1 point = 2 Euro 
 
We will randomly select one of the three parts to be payoff relevant at the end of the experiment. 
Participant at seat 21 will roll a die. If the die shows a 1 or 4, the first part of the experiment will be 
payoff relevant. If the die shows a 2 or 5, the second part is payoff relevant and if the die shows a 3 
or 6, the third part will be payoff relevant. As all parts are equally likely to be payoff relevant it is 
optimal for you to decide according to your preferences. 
In addition to the income that you earn during the experiment you will receive 4 euros for showing up 
on time. Your total income will be paid to you after the end of the experiment in cash. We will call 
each participant based on her seat number for individual payment. That is, no other participant will 
learn your payoff and also you will not learn the other participants’ payoffs.  
Anonymity 
The analysis of the experiment will be anonymous. That is, we will never link your name with the 
data generated in the experiment. You will not learn the identity of any other participant, neither 
before nor after the experiment. Also the other participants will not learn your identity. At the end of 
the experiment, you have to sign a receipt to confirm the payments you received. This receipt will 
only be used for accounting purposes. 
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On screen instructions: Instructions for Part 1  
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Decision Screen Part 1 [displayed after subjects observed the video] 
 
Belief elicitation after Part 1 [displayed after subjects entered their decision] 
	
 
Post belief elicitation question [displayed on single screen after belief elicitation] 
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Instruction for Part 2: GroupNoPC 
[for GroupPC, instructions were identical except for the fact that participants were informed that all 
group members receive a payoff of 0, if they do not enter the same number, for Individual, the 
instructions were identical to Part 1 with an additional sentence explaining that Part 2 is identical to 
Part 1.] 
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Instruction for chat [displayed after instructions for Part 2] 
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Decision Screen in Part 2 and 3 
[Decision screens in Part 2 and Part 3 were structured as in Part 1.] 
Instructions for Part 3 and Belief elicitation after Part 3 
[Instructions for Part 3 were identical to instructions for Part 1 except that answers to control 
questions were automatically selected and displayed. The belief elicitation for after Part 3 was 
identical to the belief elicitation after Part 1, except for the color of the chip determining payoff 
relevance, and it was explicitly mentioned that we are asking for the expected results for the same 
reference experiment.] 
Instructions for the additional control treatment IndividualDeliberation  
[Instructions and decision screens for Part 1 and Part 3 of IndividualDeliberation were identical to 
those from Individual. Instructions for Part 2 were identical to individual, except that we added a 
sentence informing subjects that they have the option to write down their thoughts: “Part 2 is identical 
to Part 1, except that you have now the possibility to write down your thoughts.” and an additional 
screen (see below) explaining how to write down one’s thoughts.]  
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D – Codebook: Variables for the chat analysis 
Appendix D includes the codebook that was used by our coders. 
‐ Chat in general 
o Duration (# of seconds) (duration) 
o # of messages (messages) 
o Average length of a message (# of characters, incl. spaces) (average_length) 
 
‐ Content 
Which arguments are being made to persuade other group members? How often are they alluded to 
during the entire chat? ONLY COUNT ARGUMENTS THAT ARE EXPLICITLY MENTIONED 
(e.g. if “3” was displayed and participant says “I think we should be honest and should enter 3”  
honesty=1, “I think we should enter 3”  honesty=0) 
o Money discussed in favor of lying (# of times money/points/payoffs are mentioned as 
an argument) (argument_money_lie) 
Example: We should enter 5 because it will maximize our payoffs 
o Money discussed in favor of honesty (# of times money/points/payoffs are mentioned 
as an argument) (argument_money_hon) 
Example: We should enter 3, it will still give us 6 euros 
o Honesty discussed in favor of honesty (# of times mentioned) 
(argument_honesty_hon) 
Example: Let’s be honest 
o Honesty discussed in favor of lying (# of times mentioned) (argument_honesty_lie) 
Example: There is no need to be honest 
o Refer to misunderstanding/insecurity concerning the task in favor of lying (# of times 
mentioned) (argument_insecurity_lie) 
Example: I am uncertain about the task, I thought we can enter any number we want 
to enter   
o Refer to misunderstanding/insecurity concerning the task in favor of honesty (# of 
times mentioned) (argument_insecurity_hon) 
Example: I am uncertain about the task, I thought we have to enter the number we 
saw 
o Discuss that “we should stick to the rules “(# of times mentioned) 
(argument_rules_yes) 
o Discuss that “we do not have to stick to the rules” (# of times mentioned) 
(argument_rules_no) 
o Reference to honesty of others outside the group (e.g. experimentator, people in 
general, other participants, …) (# of times mentioned) (argument_others_honest) 
o Reference to dishonesty of others outside the group (e.g. experimenter, people in 
general, other participants, …) (# of times mentioned) (argument_others_dishonest) 
o Refer to positive consequences (# of times mentioned) (consequences_pos) 
o Refer to negative consequences (# of times mentioned) (consequences_neg) 
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